The second group consists of public interests in ensuring the efficient, effective and orderly resolution of disputes. This interest is manifest in the courts' concerns to minimise the private costs associated with dispute resolution, and to avoid a multiplicity of resolutions in different venues, and the unattractive prospect of inconsistent awards or even in international commercial disputes. 10 Bell, supra n 4, 325-326.
11 Ibid, 328. 12 Briggs, supra n 2, 12.
13
There are obvious public interests that arise in international contracts involving vulnerable contracting parties, such as consumers and employees, but these types of contracts are beyond the scope of this article. This issue has attracted much less attention in Australia than in other jurisdictions, but see Quinlan v SAFE International Försäkrings AB (2006) 14 ANZ Ins Cas 61-693. 14 The majority in Akai v The People's Insurance Company held that in some circumstances, Australian courts might also be required to give mandatory effect to Australian case law: Akai Pty Ltd v The People 's Insurance Company Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418, 445 ("Akai") . There is no case that has applied that aspect of Akai.
15
The cases are unclear in identifying what constitutes such an interest. In Akai, the majority stated that a stay in favour of an exclusive jurisdiction clause "may be refused where the foreign jurisdiction clause offends the public policy of the forum whether evinced by statute or declared by judicial decision": (1996) 188 CLR 418, 445. judgments. Bell notes that the objective of upholding agreements as to forum or arbitration "may serve to fracture or fragment the dispute resolution and the policy of resolving all disputes between multiple parties in one forum may trump the policy of holding a subset of those parties to their contractual bargain." 16 In Donohoe v Armco Inc, Lord Bingham noted that the English courts may not enforce a choice of court agreement where the dispute involves third parties, not bound by the jurisdiction agreement, or other matters, not within the scope of the jurisdiction agreement. 17 The
House of Lords in that case did not enforce an express choice of English courts, because in the circumstances "the interests of justice are best served by the submission of the whole dispute to a single tribunal which is best fitted to make a reliable, comprehensive judgment on all the matters in issue."
18

C THE CURRENT AUSTRALIAN LAW ON JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
This section describes the current principles applicable to determine whether the Australian courts should stay proceedings brought in breach of arbitration and foreign jurisdiction agreements. It also considers how those principles are applied in practice in litigation in the Australian superior courts.
International Arbitration Agreements in Australian Litigation
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) relevantly requires that the courts of a member state must stay proceedings brought in breach of an international arbitration agreement, unless there are 16 Bell, supra n 4, 282. (No.s 1, 3, 4 and 5) [1998] Second, the Act requires that Australian courts enforce arbitral awards to which the New York Convention applies.
(a) The Australian Courts' Practices in Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
This article is only concerned with the first aspect of the legislation; that is, the requirement that Australian courts stay proceedings brought in breach of an agreement to arbitrate. In the next part, the Australian case law on the interpretation and application of the Act, particularly on the jurisprudence concerning the requirement of whether a matter is capable of settlement by arbitration, whether the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, is critically examined, in order to indicate the likely interpretation of similar provisions in the Hague Convention, which are based on the New York Convention.
In a majority of the recent Australian cases, the courts stay proceedings in favour of arbitration, focusing strictly on the terms of the International Arbitration Act and of the arbitration agreement. The courts quite correctly do not refer to or rely upon the factors 19 The New York Convention also requires the courts of member states to give effect to international arbitral awards, and permits non-recognition in exceptional circumstances. This aspect of the Convention is beyond the scope of this article. 20 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 7(2)(b). 21 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 7(5).
22
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 8.
that are relevant to determining whether a stay should be granted in the courts' general discretion, 23 The exceptions to enforcement that are most commonly invoked by parties seeking to avoid the effect of an agreement to arbitrate include that the other party's right to seek a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration has been waived with the result that the agreement is inoperative; that some of the claims are not capable of settlement by arbitration; and less commonly, that the agreement is null and void.
although the governing law is often identified.
(i) Inoperative agreements: waiver
It is sometimes argued that the party seeking a stay of proceedings in favour of an arbitration agreement has waived its right to seek such a stay, because of its participation in local litigation or for other reasons. 24 Waiver, if established, renders the arbitration agreement "inoperative" for the purposes of s 7(5) of the International Arbitration Act.
25
In order to establish waiver of the right to seek a stay, it must be shown that there was "an irrevocable abandonment of the right under the arbitration agreements to seek a stay of the curial proceeding and a reference to arbitration", 26 23 That is, on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The connecting factors identified as relevant to determining the natural forum by Lord Goff in Spiliada Maritime v Cansulex [1987] AC 460, 478, were adopted in Australian law : Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538, . These factors are also often identified in cases involving exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses: The 'Eleftheria ' [1970] into two categories. 34 In the first category, the courts apply a relatively narrow approach to interpretation, and closely interpret the words of the agreement. 35 In such a case, depending on the words of the agreement, the arbitration clause may be held not to apply to non-contractual claims, such as claims that the contract was performed negligently, that one party had made an actionable misrepresentation, or that one party had breached Australian legislation.
36
In the second category, the courts apply a broad and liberal approach to interpretation of the scope of the arbitration clause.
Few recent cases explicitly take a narrow approach to interpretation. [192] . Austin J accepted that the parties could not refer to arbitration the winding up of a corporation (at [193] ), following A Best Flooring Sanding Pty Ltd v Skyer Australia Ltd [1999] VSC 170 (at [191] it would be applied. 64 They held that unless the defendant could show that the foreign court would apply the legislation, an Australian court must ensure the application of the legislation by retaining jurisdiction.
65
"party autonomy does not mean complete freedom to exclude a system of law, or particular elements of a system of law, from the relationship between the parties.
Confining attention to statutory law, if the statute on its proper construction and with regard to the legislative power of the legislature applies to the parties and their conduct of the arbitration, the agreement of the parties to exclude it will count for nothing."
In The legislation does not specifically state that section 52 is to be given such an effect. to avoid the risk of inconsistent findings where the dispute involved claims which were not subject to the arbitration agreement.
(vi) Multiple parties
While the International Arbitration Act anticipates the possibility that disputes may include matters that are subject to arbitration, as well as matters that are not subject to arbitration, it makes no allowance for the existence of third parties to the arbitration agreement. In some cases, the Australian courts have held that if there are third parties involved in the dispute who are not bound by the agreement, in order to ensure a complete resolution of the dispute, a stay should not be granted. 82 The justifications for narrowly interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement in cases where third parties are involved in the dispute, with the result that the agreement may be interpreted not to apply to third party disputes, are similar to those for enforcement of arbitration agreements referred to above; namely, giving effect to the parties' presumed intentions, efficiency, and avoiding potentially inconsistent outcomes.
83
In Paharpur Cooling Towers v Paramount (WA), Steytler P and Newnes JA suggested that "where a party to an arbitration agreement makes the same claim both against the other party to the arbitration agreement and a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement -with the result that, so far as it involves the latter, the dispute cannot be referred to arbitration -it will generally be equally difficult to ascribe to the parties to the arbitration agreement an intention that in such an event the dispute should be fragmented and that the liability of the party to the arbitration In other cases, the Australian courts have emphasised the mandatory terms of subsection 7(2) and have stayed related local proceedings in favour of arbitration, even though those proceedings involve third parties to the arbitration agreement, and matters which are not subject to arbitration.
86
The courts only rarely explicitly consider whether the involvement of multiple parties, or the inclusion of non-contractual claims, appears authentic or whether those parties or claims appear to be included for "the improper purpose of fabricating jurisdiction", 87 in order to avoid the effect of the arbitration agreement.
(vii) Matters which render the agreement null and void
There are very few Australian cases in which the plaintiff has argued that the agreement is null and void. Of those 10 cases, the stay was granted without conditions in only four cases. 103 In 12 of the 17 cases, the plaintiff was Australian, whereas only 6 of 17 first defendants were Australian. In eight cases, there were other parties to the dispute, and in 12 cases, the dispute involved non-contractual claims.
101
The empirical study reported here (in respect of arbitration agreements) and below, at Section C2(c) (in respect of choice of court agreements), is in part an extension of the study of the outcome of jurisdictional disputes by Keyes, in which she analysed international jurisdictional disputes decided in the Australian superior courts between 1991 and 2001 : Jurisdiction in International Litigation (2005 On LexisNexis' Casebase, Thomson's FirstPoint and AustLII databases, using the search terms "international arbitration act and stay" and "arbitration agreement and stay", 25 cases were identified, of which eight were excluded for various reasons, as for example where injunctions were sought restraining foreign proceedings being continued in breach of arbitration agreements, or where the court determined the dispute on another basis (eg Transfield Philippines Inc v Pacific Hydro Ltd [2006] VSC 175, holding that service should be set aside because the writ was incorrectly indorsed). After excluding the cases in which the court did not decide whether to stay proceedings or not, there were 17 separate cases in which the court determined whether a stay should be granted. This included three cases which were appeals from primary decisions which are also included in the sample, in which the appeal court fully considered whether a stay should be granted. The reason for retaining the primary decision in the sample, even where that decision was appealed, was to examine the factors which influence judicial decision making in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction, which is the focus of this study (rather than the ultimate determination of any matter).
103
In one of those four cases, conditions were not imposed apparently only because of the undertaking offered by the defendant to submit disputes arising under Australian legislation to arbitration.
104
In seven cases, relief was sought under the Trade Practices Act (or the State Fair Trading Act equivalent). In two cases the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was invoked, and in one case the Insurance Although the number of cases is small, some interesting trends emerged from the data.
First, the Australian courts are in general not parochial in determining whether to stay proceedings in favour of arbitration agreements. They displayed no preference for local plaintiffs over foreign plaintiffs;
105 no preference where the governing law was local; 106 and no preference where the place of arbitration was within Australia.
107
Local defendants did, however, fare better than foreign defendants. 108 Second, where the court explicitly adopted a liberal approach to interpretation of the arbitration clause, the court was predictably twice as likely to stay proceedings as in cases where the judge explicitly took a literal approach to interpretation.
109
Third, where there were third parties involved, the court was more likely to stay proceedings than in cases where there were no third parties. 110 This result is counter-intuitive; it suggests that the addition of third parties is ineffective as a strategy for avoiding arbitration agreements in Australia.
Fourth, where the litigation involved matters other than the contractual and related matters that were arbitrable, the court was much less likely to grant a stay.
111
Contracts Act 1902 (NSW) was invoked. In two cases, disputes concerning other contracts were raised; in two cases, equitable relief was sought; in two cases, common law misrepresentation was claimed; and in one case each, there were claims of fraud, negligence and in restitution Fifthly, the 105 Stays were granted in 58% of cases involving local plaintiffs (7 of 12 cases), and in 60% of cases involving foreign defendants (3 of 5 cases).
106
Stays were granted in 50% of cases where the governing law was local (2 of 4 cases), and in 50% of cases where the governing law was foreign (2 of 4 cases). The governing law was not identified in the judgment in nine cases; of those cases, stays were granted in 67% of cases (6 of 9).
107
Stays were granted in 50% of cases where the place of arbitration was within Australia (4 of 8 cases), and in 50% of cases where the place of arbitration was not within Australia (3 of 6 cases). The place of arbitration was not identified in 3 cases, and a stay was granted in all of those cases.
108
Stays were granted in 67% of cases involving local defendants (4 out of 6 cases), but in only 55% of cases involving foreign defendants (6 out of 11 cases).
109
Stays were granted in 64% of cases in which a wide interpretation was expressly endorsed (7 of 11 cases), but in only 33% of cases in which a literal interpretation was applied (1 of 3 cases). There were three cases in which neither approach was referred to, in which stays were granted in 67% of cases (1 of 3 cases).
110
Stays were granted in 75% of cases where there were third parties involved in the local litigation (6 of 8 cases), but in only 44% of cases in which there were no third parties (4 of 9 cases). 
International Jurisdictional Agreements in Australian Litigation
The treatment of jurisdictional agreements by the Australian courts differs markedly from that of arbitration agreements. The principles applied to exclusive foreign jurisdiction agreements are distinct from those applicable to arbitration agreements and to cases where there is no effective choice of courts agreement. Derogation clauses are treated differently to prorogation clauses; the principles relevant to each are described below.
(a) Prorogation Clauses
Contractual submissions to the jurisdiction of local courts are a basis of in personam jurisdiction at common law, and under rules of court. 116 There are no specific principles in Australia that apply when one party argues that local proceedings should be stayed where there is an effective choice of Australian courts clause. In the few cases in which prorogation clauses have been challenged, the courts have applied the Australian principle of forum non conveniens to determine whether they should be enforced, 117 rather than analogising prorogation clauses to derogation clauses. As a matter of principle, prorogation clauses should be dealt with in the same way as derogation agreements.
118
In per Lord Brandon). That would require the defendant to foreign proceedings either to have submitted to the foreign jurisdiction, or to have been served with commencing process while present in the foreign jurisdiction. Neither seems likely. Merely appearing in foreign proceedings for the purposes of contesting the foreign court's jurisdiction does not constitute a submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court (Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 11 (d) and (e)). Jacobson J's judgment contains no reference to the requirement that the foreign court be regarded as jurisdictionally competent. Clough Engineering v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Gilmour J stated that, "If an Australian protective provision would be avoided by forcing an applicant to sue in the courts of a nominated jurisdiction, that is an important factor which should overcome the predisposition of a court" to enforce the jurisdictional clause. 127 Most commentators argue that it is generally inappropriate to allow parties to avoid their contractual bargain by claiming relief under Australian legislation, unless there are very specific circumstances.
128
Prevention of the fragmentation of disputes, with the attendant inefficiencies, inconvenience, and risks of inconsistent judgments, has also emerged as a strong reason for retaining jurisdiction, assuming that the forum is competent to deal with all matters in dispute and all parties.
129
"two powerful considerations in international litigation: first, the desire of courts to hold commercial parties to their bargain in terms of exclusive jurisdiction clauses;
secondly, the desire of courts to avoid disruption and multiplicity of litigation, in particular a desire to avoid parallel proceedings and the risk of inconsistent findings, and to avoid the causing of inconvenience to third parties."
The courts have referred to the tension between 130 Garnett has heavily criticised this justification, stating that "allowing a plaintiff to overcome a foreign jurisdiction clause by the simple expedient of bringing proceedings 128 R Garnett, "The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia" (1998) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 19 (asserting that this should only be permitted if the plaintiff can show that the consequence of enforcing the jurisdiction agreement would be that they would "be denied a specific right of action" or where the consequences of the jurisdiction agreement at the time of litigation, in terms of the relief that might be awarded in the foreign court, are different to the consequences at the time the contract was made). in cases involving choice of courts agreements than in cases involving arbitration agreements. 136 Bell has argued persuasively that The 'Eleftheria' should be overruled.
137
In 1998, Garnett suggested that the Australian courts took a more relaxed approach to the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements than arbitration agreements, 138 and an analysis of the recent cases bears this out. In many cases, the courts give insufficient priority to choice of courts clauses. For example, in Puccini Festival Australia Pty Ltd v Nippon Express (Australia) Pty Ltd, the defendant relied on an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause contained in a bill of lading. The plaintiff disputed that it was a party to the bill of lading, and that the terms of the bill of lading formed part of the contract. 139 Cavanough J stated that because the issue of whether the bill of lading bound the plaintiff would be a major issue at trial, it was "undesirable for me to say more about it than necessary at this interlocutory stage".
(i) Scope of Jurisdiction Clauses
This is unsatisfactory; the validity of the exclusive jurisdiction clause should have had a material effect on the outcome of this dispute.
The principles applied in interpreting jurisdiction clauses are similar to those applied in the interpretation of arbitration clauses. 141 Allsop J stated that "provisions conferring jurisdiction…should be interpreted liberally and without imposing limitations not found in the express words."
Bell, supra n However, as for arbitration clauses, in some cases the courts interpret jurisdiction clauses strictly. Duggan J recently stated that "The tendency to 4, 321. 137 Ibid, 327-328. 138 Garnett, "The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Clauses", supra n 128, 9. Although the issue has not been litigated often in Australia, there is authority that choice of court agreements are separable, and that any attack on the validity of the choice of court agreement must be directed to the choice of court agreement specifically, rather than the agreement as a whole.
145 It is not often plausible for the plaintiff to raise such an argument, but in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White, the defendant challenged the validity of the exclusive jurisdiction clause directly, asserting that the third party which had invoked the exclusive jurisdiction clause had procured the jurisdiction agreement with a view improperly to "shielding itself" from the effect of legislation, including the Australian Trade Practices Act and companies legislation, and that therefore the clause was void as being contrary to public policy, or unconscionable.
(ii) Non-exclusive Foreign Jurisdiction Clauses
In Australian law, non-exclusive foreign jurisdiction agreements have a lower status than exclusive jurisdiction agreements, and are regarded as being merely one factor relevant to determining whether a stay should be granted on the basis of forum non conveniens.
(c) Empirical Analysis of Recent Cases
This is because commencing proceedings in a forum other than the chosen court is not inconsistent with the terms of the agreement, and therefore enforcing the agreement does not mandate declining jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the current Australian principle which regulates the enforcement of foreign jurisdictional agreements, it is instructive to consider the practices of the superior courts in jurisdictional disputes involving such agreements. In 
148
On LexisNexis' Casebase, Thomson's FirstPoint and Austlii databases, and using the search terms "Akai", "jurisdiction agreement", "jurisdiction clause", "foreign jurisdiction agreement", "foreign jurisdiction clause" fourteen cases were identified, of which seven were excluded for various reasons, including that the jurisdiction clause was held not to be exclusive ( FCA 647. In one of those cases, there were two separate foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreements, which are treated separately in the following analysis, which consequently refers to eight cases in total.
149
In a study of the disposition of jurisdiction disputes in the Australian superior courts between 1991 and 2001, there were 24 cases in which the effect of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement was in issue: Keyes, supra n 101, 163.
150
Villasenor v The World of Residensea II Ltd [2007] FCA 647; this case is unusual because the applicant in Australian proceedings sought only an interlocutory injunction, and accepted that after that injunction had taken its course, the proceedings would be permanently stayed in favour of the foreign jurisdiction agreement.
The courts commonly referred to the factors identified as relevant in The 'Eleftheria'. In six cases, the plaintiff was Australian; whereas none of the first defendants (the party seeking enforcement) was Australian. 151 The court referred to the location of evidence in only two cases, in which it held that the preponderance of evidence was to be found within the forum. The governing law was identified in five cases. In two of those cases, Australian legislation was held to be applicable, notwithstanding an otherwise effective choice of foreign law clause. The plaintiff included claims under Australian legislation in five of the eight cases.
152
Although the number of cases is very small, several trends can be identified from the data. First, the courts were more likely to stay proceedings involving a foreign plaintiff than in cases involving a local plaintiff.
In four cases, the court explicitly concluded that the plaintiff would enjoy a legitimate juridical advantage in litigation in the forum because of the application of Australian legislation.
153 Second, the courts were more likely to stay proceedings where there were no third parties involved. In a small number of cases, there were additional defendants -not parties to the jurisdiction agreement -who were Australian.
Finally, the place where the relevant activities which gave rise to the dispute between the parties occurred was related to A stay was granted in one of the two cases in which the plaintiff was foreign (50%), and in no case in which the plaintiff was local (0 of 6 cases).
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A stay was granted in 33% of cases in which there were no third parties (1 of 3 cases), and in no cases in which third parties were involved (0 of 5 cases).
155
Stays were granted in no cases in which the court identified a legitimate advantage (0 of 4 cases), and in 25% of cases in which no advantage was identified (1 of 4 cases).
156
Stays were granted in no cases including a claim under forum legislation (0 of 5 cases), and in 33% of cases which did not include such a claim (1 of 3 cases).
outcomes. Where at least some of the activities occurred locally, the court granted a stay in no cases; but in the single case in which all the activities occurred abroad, the court granted a stay. 158 The data presented above show decisively that in the last seven years, the Australian courts were much less likely to give effect to exclusive foreign jurisdictional agreements than to international arbitration agreements.
(d) Conclusion
Although the applicable principle suggests that derogation clauses should be enforced unless there are strong grounds for non-enforcement, in the vast majority of recent Australian cases, they have not been enforced. Relevant activities occurred locally in three cases; both locally and abroad in two cases. The location of relevant activities was not specifically identified in two cases.
As demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, arbitration agreements are more likely to be enforced than jurisdictional agreements. It should be a matter of concern that the Australian courts' record in enforcing foreign choice of courts agreements in recent years has deteriorated. This very 158 Keyes, supra n 101, 168. 159 Particular differences in these two studies show that the governing law has become a less important factor; that the availability of relief under s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has become more important; that in the past there were proportionally more foreign plaintiffs, and fewer foreign defendants, and that it is more likely that the parties will specifically seek to identify the existence of juridical advantages in order to avoid enforcement: ibid, 163-168. clearly demonstrates the need for improvement to the Australian law on enforcing jurisdiction agreements. In the next section, the capacity of the Hague Choice of Courts Convention to contribute to this reform is critically considered.
D THE JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN THE HAGUE CHOICE OF COURTS CONVENTION
The Hague Convention assumes that the scheme of the New York Convention can successfully be emulated in the context of international choice of court agreements.
161
The Hague Convention is intended to protect autonomy and to provide predictability and certainty in international trade and commerce.
162
The Convention applies to a sub-set of international commercial disputes. It only applies to civil and commercial disputes in which the parties have concluded an exclusive choice of courts agreement.
In the following discussion, the jurisdictional provisions of the Hague Convention are discussed, in order to establish the extent to which they differ from the current Australian law, and whether they are likely to improve the practices of the Australian courts.
163
The Convention expressly excludes a significant number of matters from its scope; most significantly consumer and employment contracts, 164 and a number of other matters, only some of which seem naturally related to disputes arising from a contract.
165
Most relevantly, for the purposes of this discussion, the subject matter exceptions include "anti-trust (competition)" matters. Art.3(b). 169 Garnett, "The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Clauses"supra n 128, 5-9; Keyes, supra n 101, 97 170 Art.5(1); Hartley and Dogauchi, supra n 167, 21, [42] [43] Article 19. 171 Article 5(2) states that the chosen court cannot decline jurisdiction on the basis that a foreign court should determine the dispute. This is intended to preclude reference to the principle of forum non conveniens, and to any consideration of parallel proceedings.
172
The Convention enacts separability of choice of court agreements.
This would change the current Australian law, although in practice it is unlikely that it would change the outcome of many cases. Considering the increased prominence which has been given in recent cases to the objective of preventing fragmentation of disputes, depriving the courts of their discretion in this way may stimulate the development of creative arguments in practice. 173 There is Australian authority suggesting that jurisdiction agreements are separable, 174 so this provision would not significantly change the current Australian law, although it would place the principle on a more secure footing. It can be anticipated that direct attacks on jurisdictional agreements will become more common.
175
The second aspect of the Hague Convention's scheme is that the non-chosen court is obliged to stay proceedings brought in breach of the agreement. The Convention deprives the non-chosen court of the discretion whether to retain jurisdiction, if the criteria of application are satisfied and none of the exceptions apply. The first group of exceptions are relatively uncontroversial, and seem unlikely to be raised in practice. It is unusual for chosen courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction; in the unlikely event that a chosen court declines jurisdiction, it is of course essential to preserve the parties' entitlement to a hearing. The exception which permits nonenforcement of a choice of courts clause where to do so would lead to manifest injustice is intended to refer, for example, to situations in which one of the parties could not get a fair trial in foreign proceedings. 183 This does not differ from the current Australian law, which presently permits reference to this consideration as one of the factors identified by
Brandon J in The 'Eleftheria'. 184 Although Bell criticised the other factors identified by Brandon J, he correctly accepted that the non-availability of a fair trial in the chosen court is a sound justification for non-enforcement of jurisdictional agreements.
185
However, the injustice exception is unlikely to be successful, even if raised, in Australian litigation. The Australian courts do not look favourably on arguments that jurisdiction should be retained because of perceived shortcomings in the foreign legal system. In
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills, the High Court held that there were "powerful policy considerations which militate against Australian Courts sitting in judgment upon the ability or willingness of the courts of another country to accord justice to the Plaintiff in 183 Hartley and Dogauchi, ibid.
184
The 'Eleftheria ' [1970] P 94, 100. 185 Bell, supra n 4, 328.
the particular case". 186 In most cases in which concerns about the quality of litigation in foreign courts are raised, the courts have refused to take this factor into account.
187
As Garnett suggests, it is also possible that Australian courts may hold that a loss of the right to claim under Australian legislation, which would be a consequence of the enforcement of a choice of court agreement, amounts to a "manifest injustice" which warrants non-enforcement of the agreement. 188 The narrow scope of the second group of exceptions would be likely to lead to more regular enforcement of choice of court agreements, if the Convention were implemented in Australia. The exception which permits non-enforcement if the choice of court agreement is null and void specifies that this issue must be determined by the law of the chosen court.
189
This stipulation differs from the Australian common law, which unjustifiably requires application of forum law to determine the validity of jurisdictional agreements.
190
The public policy exception "is intended to set a high threshold".
191
The official commentary on this provision is unfortunately brief and does not clearly state whether statutes which are regarded as having internationally mandatory effect are intended to be included in this exception. 193 Whereas the New York Convention allows that arbitration agreements may not be enforced if they are "incapable of being performed", the Hague Convention only allows non-enforcement if the agreement cannot be performed because of "exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties". This is intended to apply only in the most unusual of circumstances; according to the Hartley/Dogauchi Report, it is akin to the common law doctrine of frustration.
The public policy exception is likely to be a focus of attempts to avoid choice of courts agreements, if the Convention is implemented in Australia. 194 There are two important differences between the Hague Convention and the New York Convention which are material to the current discussion. First, the Hague Convention does not allow non-enforcement when the agreement is inoperative. In the case of arbitration agreements, this applies where the parties have mutually or unilaterally abandoned the agreement. It is entirely foreseeable that this might occur in the choice of courts context, and yet no exception unambiguously extends to this prospect.
This exception seems unlikely to be invoked in practice. 195 Second, the New York Convention specifically allows the court to stay only the part of the proceeding to which the arbitration agreement applies, whereas the Hague Convention evidently would require the court to stay the entire proceeding. Both of these matters have been shown to arise commonly in practice, and therefore should have been dealt with directly in the Hague Convention. 194 Hartley and Dogauchi, supra n 167, 48. 195 Of course, the parties may by later agreement vary their agreement as to exclusive choice of court. If such a variation is established, the consequence would be that the original exclusive choice of court agreement no longer existed and therefore Art.6 would not apply to it. 196 Art.6. Alternatively, it might be argued that Art.6 only requires a stay to be granted if every aspect of the proceedings is subject to the choice of courts clause. It could also be argued that Art.6 requires a stay to be granted only of the part of the proceeding to which the choice of court agreement applies.
Summary
The Convention's objective to remove much of the courts' discretion in deciding whether to enforce the agreements of the parties is similar to the New York Convention.
197
"provide for the mechanical enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate or adjudicate even where this has a fragmenting effect on the overall resolution of complex disputes. Opinions will legitimately differ on whether this is a desirable outcome; it is not the approach which has commended itself to the common law."
Briggs observed that these instruments all 198 One suspects that the common law's deep-seated discomfort with the mechanical enforcement of rules, and preference for the ability to exercise the discretion to do justice in all the circumstances, might account for the fact that a stay was not granted in seven out of 17 recent Australian cases on enforcing the New York Convention. It suggests that the Australian courts are not likely to achieve 100% compliance with the Hague Convention, if it is implemented in Australian law.
Briggs recently noted that "the Convention is, from an English perspective, modest.
One would think it was hard to imagine that the private international law of any mature legal system is very far removed from this state of development ". 199 197 It resembles also the scheme of the Brussels I Regulation: Briggs, supra n In Australia, the Convention should have a more significant impact. As discussed above, Australian courts have not improved in their treatment of jurisdiction agreements in recent years, and this is a matter that requires attention. Although there are some potential problems with the Hague Convention, it is likely to result in choice of courts agreements being enforced more frequently, a highly desirable outcome. 2, 531. 198 Ibid, 531. 199 Ibid, 529.
